Abstract-The evolution of electrical grids, both in terms of enhanced ICT functionalities to improve efficiency, reliability and economics, as well as the increasing penetration of renewable redistributed energy resources, results in a more sophisticated electrical infrastructure which poses new challenges from several perspectives, including resilience and quality of service analysis. In addition, the presence of interdependencies, which more and more characterize critical infrastructures (including the power sector), exacerbates the need for advanced analysis approaches, to be possibly employed since the early phases of the system design, to identify vulnerabilities and appropriate countermeasures. In this paper, we outline an approach to model and analyze smart grids and discuss the major challenges to be addressed in stochastic model-based analysis to account for the peculiarities of the involved system elements. Representation of dynamic and flexible behavior of generators and loads, as well as representation of the complex ICT control functions required to preserve and/or re-establish electrical equilibrium in presence of changes need to be faced to assess suitable indicators of the resilience and quality of service of the smart grid.
I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK
Smart grids aim at evolving the traditional electrical grid system by introducing sophisticated ICT control functionalities to improve efficiency, reliability and economics, as well as the increasing penetration of renewable distributed energy resources to favor sustainability of the production and distribution of electricity. This results in a more sophisticated electrical infrastructure which poses new challenges from several perspectives, including resilience and quality of service analysis. In addition, the presence of interdependencies, which more and more characterize critical infrastructures (including the power sector), exacerbates the need for advanced analysis approaches, to be possibly employed since the early phases of the system design, able to represent and master an integrated vision of the entire system, seen as a system of systems with intricate relationships among them.
Stochastic model-based analysis [1] is widely applied as an early validation technique in a variety of studies, including those focusing on resilience and, in general, quality of service properties. Its reduced cost, compared to measurement-based methods, makes it an attractive alternative to analyze a system towards identification of weaknesses and vulnerabilities, so that means to enhance system robustness can be identified and put in place. To account for interdependencies existing among the major infrastructures composing an electrical power system, the system model needs to include all the involved components, to trace the propagation of phenomena affecting individual parts. The resulting complexity needs to be managed from several perspectives, including resorting to an appropriate abstraction level of the involved structural and behavioral aspects, as well as promoting modular and compositional approaches to model development.
In this paper, we address the analysis of smart grids in terms of indicators representative of their resilience as perceived by final customers as well as distribution system operators. The results of this kind of analysis can be exploited to understand the dynamics of failures and potential system vulnerabilities, against which appropriate countermeasures need to be identified. The objective of the work is to build a general and composable modeling framework, populated by template building blocks which represent models of components/events, so as to be able to account for a variety of grid configurations and critical situations characterized by failure events, in presence of interdependencies. Fulfilling such objective requires significant effort, both in resources and time, and is part of the contribution planned by the ongoing European project SmartC2Net (https://intern.smartc2net.eu). The current developments tackle the work from a logical and systematic angle, by i) identifying the abstracted system architecture to be modeled; ii) introducing relevant analysis indicators; and iii) exploring modeling approaches able to trade between efficiency of the solution and accuracy in modeling a variety of smart grid configurations and sophisticated control functionalities. The challenges raised by the dynamic and flexible behavior (as shown by renewable energy resources and by categories of loads at the medium and low voltage level), as well as by the electrical productionconsumption equilibrium in the smart distribution grid are discussed, with reference to their implications on the modeling and solution approach. These are fundamental steps towards a sound modeling and analysis framework for smart grids.
Previous studies have pursued similar objectives, but focusing on interdependencies at the level of the electric transmission grid, such as [2] - [5] . Although we get inspiration from previous experience with modeling the transmission segment, here we account for the volatility of the microgrid generation and newly appliances to control and manage distribution of electricity to medium and low voltage loads.
With reference to the distribution grid, most of the proposals in the literature address the modeling of cyber attacks to reveal vulnerabilities, perform impact analysis and assess the cyber risk, e.g. [6] - [8] . Our framework targets a wider characterization of the fault model, including both accidental faults, affecting either the ICT control infrastructure or the electric grid, and cyber attacks to the ICT control, in addition to a special focus on the reciprocal dependencies originating failure cascading effects. Simulation studies also offer an alternative approach able to account for both the electrical grid and the smart ICT control for analyzing the dynamics and mutual impacts of both domains, such as [9] , where however the focus is on the evaluation of real-time performance indicators, while our objective is to assess a wider class of resilience and QoS indicators, explicitly accounting for failures and their propagation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the main logical components of the smart grid to be considered in the modeling framework, the characterization of their state and their relationships. Section III describes the fault model assumed, as well as the interdependencies due to the interconnections among the electrical distribution grid and its control subsystem. A set of resilience-related metrics of interest for the analysis is included in Section IV, while discussion and identification of the approach to build the modeling framework, with preliminary exemplifications using the SAN formalism are carried on in Section V. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE SMART GRID SYSTEM
In this section, we describe the main logical components of the smart grid (SG) to be considered in the modeling framework and their relationships, as derived from the description of the architecture [10] and of the use cases [11] developed by the EU SmartC2Net project. The focus is on SG at level of electrical distribution systems.
The considered SG is logically structured in two cooperating parts: the Electric Infrastructure (EI) and the Monitoring and Control System (MCS) based on the Information and Communications Technologies (ICT).
A. The Electrical Distribution Infrastructure
The EI represents the electrical infrastructure, which is responsible for generating electric power at medium and low voltage, and for transporting towards the final users the electric power received from the transmission system and generated at medium and low voltage. The EI is structured in two segments, as shown in Fig. 1a : (i) MV-EI: the medium voltage electrical distribution infrastructure (with an operating voltage of 10kV-60kV) physically connected to the high voltage (HV-EI) and low voltage electrical infrastructures.
(ii) LV-EI: the low voltage electrical distribution infrastructure (220V-380V), physically connected to MV-EI. MV-EI and LV-EI can be logically structured in: The topology of MV-EI and LV-EI is typically a radial graph, Fig. (1b) or, for redundancy purposes, a partially meshed (e.g., ring, selective or spot) graph. An arc (or branch) of the graph represents a power line with the associated switch and protection breakers, if any. The logical structure of a generic arc is shown in Fig. 1c , where a power line (PL) with the associated protection units, including breakers, and the associated switch (SW) are considered. Changing the state of a switch, it is possible to modify the topology of the network and to reconfigure the distribution system.
A node represents a generator, a load or a substation or a combination of them. For simplicity of representation, each generic node, representing a station or substation, can be structured like a bus-bar (bus) with the associated electrical equipment. Fig. 2 shows the logical scheme adopted for a generic node of MV-EI. Protection units (including breakers), which are physically part of a substation, are not explicitly Figure 2 . Logical scheme of a node of MV-EI. In a real world instance of the node, only a subset of the components connected to BUS is considered.
represented, but they are implicitly included in the logical components. The logical structure of a specific power station, load station or substation may be obtained considering a subset of the logical components associated to the generic node, depending on the real structure of the considered component.
Components considered in a generic node of MV-EI are based on the following components: can be considered alternatively (flexible) generator or (flexible) load, depending on the state of the power system. They can be placed near to renewable energy systems to smooth their generation profile, or they can be directly operated by the distribution system operators (DSO) to enhance network performances, i.e., to help to supply peak power and to improve power quality (e.g., through voltage regulation) [12] .
• Transformers with on load tap changers (OLTC): transformers having voltage regulators at primary substations.
• Voltage regulators (VR).
• Capacitor banks (CB): voltage regulators based on the injection of reactive power. Generation, energy storage and load systems that are connected to a power distribution system are defined as generic distributed energy resource (DER).
The logical structure of a generic node of LV-EI is based on the following components:
• DG, FG, DS, L, FL (like electrical vehicle charging, that can be used by the local DSO to manage power quality control in the LV grid along with decentralized PV production as well as other loads, e.g. households [11] ), Transformer (T) having off-load tap changers.
• Micro/mini generators (MG): volatile small-scale energy generating units, producing electricity at lower voltage levels, e.g., from wind or solar/photovoltaic. Traditionally, OLTC, capacitor banks and remotely controlled switches are not available at LV-EI [13] ; consequently, they are not considered in the logical scheme of the node, although it can be extended to include them.
B. The Monitoring and Control System based on the Information and Communications Technologies
The MCS represents the system that monitors and controls the physical parameters of the electric infrastructure, and triggers appropriate reconfiguration when needed (e.g., in emergency situations). The main objectives of the MCS are: a) to balance production and consumption as locally as possible in order to avoid transmission losses, b) to increase transmission reliability, through ancillary services such as voltage/var support, switches reconfiguration, generator redispatching and load shedding. Control and automation functions are no longer limited to control center and appear throughout the network. They are hierarchically organized, with control layers corresponding to the main voltage levels. Thus, MCS is hierarchically structured in three main logical components, shown in to the controlled components, the corrective actions are put in operation through the pertinent logical controller (LC), i.e., an ICT-based component having the ability to monitor/control an electrical component. Each LC guarantees the correct operation of the controlled component and reconfigures it in case of fault of some apparatus. At the level of abstraction considered, LC includes the data acquisition and control equipment (sensors and actuators) and also smart meter or Customer Energy Management System (CEMS), if needed. At medium voltage, one MVGC is associated to each different primary substation. MVGC monitors and controls all the medium-voltage electrical components connected (directly or indirectly) to the primary substation, i.e., the components located along the feeders emanating from the primary substation, and that can be remotely controlled by an operator. At low voltage, one LVGC is associated to each different secondary substation. LVGC monitors and controls all the low-voltage electrical components connected to the secondary substation. At medium and low voltage, an LC is associated to each electrical component that can be directly controlled by an LC. Fig. 4 shows all the electrical components, at low voltage, under the direct control of an operator. The logical component MVG represents the power source corresponding to a medium-voltage distribution line feeding a secondary substation. MVG is not under the direct control of LVGC, that receives the set points for MVG from MVGC.
It can be assumed that LC can operate in: (i) isolated/ independent/non-coordinated mode, (ii) coordinated/central mode, or (iii) both isolated and coordinated mode. Isolated mode occurs when each device is controlled independently, without considering the consequences of actions taken by other control devices [14] (traditional approach used for voltage/var control devices). With the isolated mode, a new timely, though inconsistent or suboptimal, configuration for EI can be obtained without the intervention of LVGC and MVGC (and CSYS).
Coordinated mode occurs when the operations of all the LC that control the components located along the feeders emanating from the same primary or secondary substation, are coordinated [15] , respectively, by the MVGC or LVGC (with the contribution of CSYS) associated to the substation. With the coordinated mode, a new consistent and (more) optimal, though less timely or delayed, configuration for EI can be only obtained with the intervention of LVGC or MVGC.
Both isolated and coordinated modes occur when a new (timely, though inconsistent or suboptimal) configuration for EI is first obtained without the intervention of LVGC and MVGC, and next, a new (optimal, though delayed) configuration for EI is obtained with the intervention of LVGC or MVGC.
No LC is associated to electrical components that are not under the direct control of an operator; the state of these electrical components (e.g., the value of voltage) can change as a result of a reconfiguration of the controlled electrical components. If an electrical component can be controlled only in isolated/non-coordinated mode, then the associated LC is not connected to MVGC or LVGC by a communication network.
MCS actions are abstracted at one or two levels on the basis of the locality of the EI state considered by MCS to decide on proper reactions to disruptions: i) single LC local level (isolated mode): only the state local to the affected EI component is considered by each involved LC, ii) MVGC/ LVGC global level (coordinated mode): the state global to all the affected EI system under the control of MVGC/LVGC is considered. Each level is characterized by:
• an activation condition, specifying the events that enable the MCS reaction: disruption/faults, intermittency of renewable sources, power demand variation, etc.,
• a reaction delay, representing the computation and application time needed by MCS to apply a reconfiguration, • a reconfiguration strategy, based on redispatch (varying the generated power), load shedding (varying the load demand), voltage/var control, load balancing, power loss reduction, line overload reduction, etc. The reconfiguration strategy RS defines how the configuration of EI changes when MCS reacts to an event that has compromised the electrical equilibrium. For each level, a different reconfiguration function can be considered.
C. State Definition of the Smart Grid
The state of EI is an hybrid-state composed by a discrete part and a continuous part. To represent the discrete part the following entities have to be considered:
• an oriented graph T G , representing the topology of EI (as shown for example in Fig. 1b) , i.e., nodes and arcs with the associated components (as shown for example in Fig. 1c and 2 ) and the direction of the current flow on each power line, • the quantities representing the possible discrete settings of the electrical control devices, like those used to VOLT/VAR control (OLTC, capacitor banks, etc.), i.e., for example, the value on/off for each capacitor and the tap position for each OLTC (over the number of available tap positions) considered in EI, • the discrete quantities representing the correct behavior or failed behavior/outage (due to an accidental or intentional fault) of the electrical components. For the continuous part of the EI state, the following physical quantities have been considered: V , δ V , I, P and Q associated with the equipment that constitutes the electric infrastructure (generators, loads, buses, power lines, etc.), i.e., respectively, voltage, voltage phase angle, current flow, active and reactive power. Each state of EI can be represented through a function of the entities described above.
The state of MCS can be considered discrete, in the sense that it is only composed by discrete values. These values have to represent mainly the correct or failed (due to an accidental or malicious fault) behavior of the electrical components. Possible values are: working, failure, omission failure, repairing, etc.
D. Characterization and Behavior of Electrical Components
In this section, the parameters/quantities, the characterization and the behavior of the main electrical components, that are considered in the proposed modeling framework, are presented and discussed.
1) Buses:
Voltage V h (t), phase angle of the voltage δ V,h (t), active power P h (t) and reactive power Q h (t) are associated to the bus h at time t. In order to not degrade the customer voltage supply quality, feeder voltage should be maintained within the permissible range [15] , i.e.:
with 0 ≤ ≤ 1. When the voltage profile of a component reaches the statutory upper or lower limit, then the protection will trip for overvoltage/undervoltage causing the voltage to drop. This can propagate through the network causing other components to trip aggravating even more this problem and further reducing system voltage. The values of P h (t), Q h (t), V h (t) and δ V (t) can be influenced by various factors, these being the current through the lines connected to node h and the power injection and absorption at bus h by generators, loads (or storage), voltage and reactive power control devices.
2) Power Lines: Maximum power flow I max l that a power line can carry without being overloaded (capacity), power flow I l (t), impedance Z l (representing all forms of opposition to power flow), voltage drop ΔV l and line power loss ΔS l are associated to the power line l at time t. When, at time t, the power flow exceeds the capacity, i.e. 
4) Flexible Loads and Flexibility Patterns:
The quantities considered for the flexible load F L i on the node i at time t are the same as those for the non-flexible loads described above, except that the power demand D(t) is flexible. The power flexibility of the power demand can be exploited in three dimensions: time, energy amount or tariff for the user or the cost for the operator. For flexible loads, the power demand that is not met UD i (t) could be not considered a blackout for the final customer, or it could represent a cost lesser than that corresponding to a blackout, depending on the flexibility pattern adopted for D i (t).
A flexibility pattern represents the flexibility of a load in terms of intervals of time for which UD i (t) is (or is not) a blackout, or in general a cost, for the customer/operator, based on the tariff/cost associated to each interval.
A first flexibility pattern is described by F P
, where: A second flexibility pattern is described by F P D i (t, w) = (D i (t), w, t 1 , l 1 , w 1 , t 2 , l 2 , w 2 , . . . , t m , l m , w m 
≤ w, the customer requests the satisfaction of the demand D i (t); in case the demand is not satisfied, a cost/blackout is incurred. On the contrary, in the time intervals where a tariff greater than w is valid, i.e., for each j such that w j > w, P D i (t) could be also less than D i (t); in this case, the lack of satisfied demand is not perceived as a blackout/cost. Notice that, another period of time with the corresponding tariff can be included, by considering the period complementary to the first m intervals, i.e., a tariff w m+1 for each time t, such that t < t 1 or t j + l j < t < t j+1 , for j = 2, . . . , m − 1, or t > t m . This second example is a generalization, based on the tariff, of the first example of flexibility pattern.
A third flexibility pattern extends the previous one by introducing the constraint that the cumulated power demand required in an interval (t, l) by the load i, i.e., P
D,cum i
, must be equal to D 
• it is lost (a cost for the operator),
• it is stored into (distributed) storage units, • it is supplied to reconfigured flexible loads (such as electrical vehicles, that can accept higher demand), • it is supplied to non-flexible loads, replacing the energy produced by flexible generators (redispatch of the generated power is required).
• it is not met (a cost for the final customer and for the operator), • it is supplied by (distributed) storage units (possibly on the same bus of the generator, if any), • it is shifted over time, if it is required by flexible loads, • it is supplied by a flexible generator.
6) Distributed Storage Unit:
The quantities associated to a distributed storage unit (battery) on the bus i (DS i ) are: storage capacity, i.e., the current amount of electric charge DS c i (t) stored at time t (represents the maximum amount of energy that can be extracted from the battery under certain specified conditions), with 0 ≤ DS (requested in the 10-100 minutes range); efficiency (charge/discharge rate); and expected lifetime (cycles) [12] . Storage units can act as:
• generator: when it can supply energy, if DS . They can be associated to distributed generators to reduce the variability of the volatile generation. It is assumed that storage units are operated directly by the Distribution Company in order to increase network control capabilities [12] . 
III. FAULT MODEL AND INTERDEPENDENCIES BETWEEN EI AND MCS
The failures of the electrical components can be summarized in:
• failures involving only the electrical quantities of the components: overloads of power lines, voltage variation outside the regulatory limits (voltage collapse), unexpected reduction of generated power and unexpected increase or reduction of power required by loads;
• failures involving the topology of the grid T G (disconnection of components). A failure involving T G triggers new values for the electrical quantities of EI.
The failures of the MCS components can be summarized in content failures (affecting the content of the service output), timing failures (when the timing of output delivery deviates from implementing the component function), halt failure (when the service is halted and the external output becomes constant) and inconsistent failure (when some or all component users perceive differently incorrect service and some users may actually perceive correct service) [16] . The effects of failures of the MCS components on the overall EI could be:
• wrong application of a reconfiguration (either when effectively required or a spurious one), or • delayed/omitted application of a reconfiguration when necessary (timing or halt failure). For example, a logical controller LC affected by content failure applies set points with erroneous random values to the controlled component. Failures of the component LC can also impact on the input values (including state information) that the components LV GC (or MV GC) receive from LC. The failure of the components CSY S, MV GC or LV GC corresponds to an erroneous reconfiguration of the state of the EI (including a non-needed reconfiguration or no reconfiguration) affecting one or more components of the controlled area. The effect of the failure of CSY S, MV GC or LV GC on a component controlled by LC is the same as the failure of the component LC associated to the controlled component. In general, the failure of the components CSY S, MV GC or LV GC may depend on the failures of the components connected to them by a network. The (content, timing or halt) failure of a communication network AN connecting LV GC and different LC has the same effect of the failure of the LV GC.
Two classes of faults are defined: accidental faults (nonmalicious faults caused by mistakes or by natural phenomena without human participation) and malicious faults. Accidental faults are considered for both the EI (e.g., a power line broken by a fallen tree) and MCS. Malicious attacks considered in the model are cyber attacks (e.g., flooding based DoS and fake messages) to the control components, namely CSY S, MV GC, LV GC, LC, W AN and AN , involving the main control functions and their communications. Malicious attacks to MCS can result in delayed/missing data or fake data about measurements, forecasts, set points, etc., thus conveying incorrect information in the control flow.
Due to the strong interconnection between EI and MCS, a failure in EI propagates to MCS and vice versa (interdependencies), possibly resulting in cascading or escalating failure. The hybrid-state of EI changes when occurs one of the following events: fault, voltage/var regulation or reconfiguration action by MCS (including erroneous, delayed or not required action) and maintenance actions. MCS actions that change the state of EI can be correctly activated by an event in the EI, or can be erroneously activated by a failure of the MCS. The discrete-state of MCS can change when occurs one of the following events: failure of a component of MCS, recovery from a failure in MCS, fault in EI. Interdependencies from MCS to EI occur, for example, when due to a content failure of MCS a power line could be erroneously open, leading to a disconnection of a part of the electrical network. Interdependencies from EI to MCS occur, for example, when a failure in the EI causes a blackout that reduces the performance of the private or public networks used by MCS, or isolates part of the MCS. Interdependencies from EI and MCS to EI occur, for example, when: a) the MCS fails and does not remove an overload of a power line, the overloaded line opens or fails and the topology changes, other lines are overloaded and the disruption propagates; b) the MCS fails and does not control the voltage raising (due to intermittency of renewable units), the voltage upper limit is reached, the generator protection trips, other DG units on the same area will sense the same problem, also their protection trips leading to a sudden voltage drop and the disruption propagates to a set of contiguous EI components, aggravating even more this problem [13] .
IV. METRICS UNDER EVALUATION
The resilience of a SG system can be evaluated in terms of a variety of measures of interest to final customers, service providers and operators. Especially, blackout-related indicators, as well as performability [17] related ones are among those we consider in our stochastic model based analysis, as listed in the following.
• The percentages UD(t) and UD(0, t) of undelivered power (the undelivered power divided by the power demand) for the whole grid (o for the load i) at time t or in the interval [0, t], respectively.
• The number of hours of undelivered power demand to load i, UD H i , or for the whole grid, UD H , from the time of disruption (or time 0) until the restoration of the correct state of the power system (that is, after the repair of all the failed components, condition required for all power demand to be met). These measures do not express the loss of power demand in terms of absolute values of power unit, e.g., MW (megawatt), but rather in terms of hours of undelivered power demand. Thus, they provide an intuitive quantification of the loss of power demand that is independent from a reference time window for the analysis [18] .
• The reward measures Y (t) and Y (0, t) at time t or in the interval [0, t], respectively, based on a reward structure where costs and rewards are considered from the point of the view of power producers and distributors: -Costs are associated to generators, depending on: the quantity of required/produced power, the generator type, the fault of the generator and the time t. -Rewards are associated to satisfied loads, depending on: the quantity of required/consumed power, the criticality of the load, the time t. -Costs are associated to each interruption of service, depending on: the difference between the required power and the available power for each load, the number of loads which will be powered off, the criticality of loads which will be powered off, duration of the interruption, the time t.
• The actual voltage V h (t) and the active P h (t) and reactive Q h (t) power, for each electrical component h at time t.
• The loss of active power, i.e., the difference between the active power injected by the generators and the active power absorbed by the loads, at time t, P loss (t), or in the interval [0, t], P loss (0, t).
• The number of failed components, at time t, or in the interval [0, t]. For flexible loads, the definition of power demand that is not met depends on the flexibility pattern considered, as described in Section II-D. The defined measures of interest can be evaluated in terms of mean, variance or distribution.
V. MODELING AND EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
To model and evaluate the measures of interest introduced in Section IV we first define a stochastic model representing the behavior of the SG system at the needed level of detail, then we define the performance (or reward) variables representing the measures of interest and finally we evaluate the measures by simulation.
A. Important Aspects of the Smart Grid
The modeling and evaluation framework should be able to represent the following structural and behavioral aspects of the SG systems.
1) Structural Aspects of the Smart Grid:
The SG system has a natural hierarchical structure, as shown in the logical schemes of Fig. 3 and 4 . At a certain level of detail, the system is composed by many similar components having the same logical structure, as shown in Fig. 1c for the power lines (arcs), in Fig. 2 for the substations (nodes) and in Fig. 3 for different instances of the same component MV GC, LV GC, LC, W AN and AN . These components can be grouped based on similar sub-components, e.g.: i) all the substations logically structured as a bus and a generator N G , or ii) all the substations logically structured as a bus and a load N L , or iii) all the substations logically structured as a bus, a generator and a load N GL . All similar components can be considered non anonymous replicas having the same structure and different parameter values for the activities and the events represented. Alternatively, in order to try to improve the efficiency of the resulting model in terms of simulation time, the number of replicated components could be reduced considering a more complex component to replicate, like as, for example, the triple substation, power line and substation, i.e. NAN = N 1 , A, N 2 , where N 1 and N 2 represent the starting and ending nodes linked to the power line represented by direct arc A. All the logical sub-components defined for NODE and ARC are included in the model, but disabling (in the final resulting model) all the sub-components of a specific replica that are already represented by a different replica. In this example, n A non anonymous replicas of the generic component NAN are considered, one replica NAN l for each power line l, being n A the number of power lines. For example, if only a generator is associated to the node N 1 , then in the final model, all the other sub-components of the node N 1 are disabled, except those representing the generator and the bus. Following the same approach, also the control components, like as LC, can be included in NAN, or can be grouped in replicas modeled separately.
2) Behavioral Aspects of SG:
The time to failures of the electrical components depends also on the value of the electrical quantities associated to the components. A failure of a component can propagate to contiguous components. Depending on the failure type, the propagation time of a failure could be considered instantaneous. Protections can stop the propagation of a failure by isolating from the grid the component affected by a failure. The activation time of a protection should not be considered instantaneous. The correct activation of a protection depends also on the "strength" of the failure and on the value of the electrical parameters associated to the protection component. The reaction time (with respect to the occurrence of a failure), the failure time and erroneous activation time (when no failure is occurred) of a control component (e.g., MV GC, LV GC or LC) should be considered.
Different functions, with the goal of finding an optimal reconfiguration strategy RS (new set points), should be considered, including voltage/var control algorithms. These functions receive in input the values for V , δ V , I, P , Q and T G , for which EI is not in equilibrium (that is, it is not in acceptable state in terms of costs, voltage, etc.) and outputs the new values for V , δ V , I, P , Q and T G for which the system EI is in equilibrium (in an acceptable state) and satisfies bounds and constraints (i.e., load balancing, power loss reduction, load shedding, generator redispatch, voltage control, reactive power control, line overload reduction, opening or closing sectioning switches), if possible.
B. Framework's Requirements
The main features that a modeling and evaluation framework should possess for the analysis of SG, are presented with respect to the following aspects: i) modeling power, i.e., the basic modeling formalisms needed to build the SG model; ii) modeling efficiency, i.e. the advanced modeling mechanisms needed to build the SG model more efficiently; and iii) solution power, i.e., the ability to provide efficient methods to evaluate the measures of interest [19] .
1) Modeling power:
Continuous, discrete and hybrid states. Conditions enabling time consuming events, time distributions and probability distributions that can depend both on the discrete and on the continuous state. Call to the functions which describe the effect (in terms of state changes) of the reconfiguration and voltage/var control algorithms. Definition of dependability and performability measures.
2) Modeling efficiency: Hierarchical composition of different submodels based on replication and composition operators. Replication of anonymous and non anonymous submodels, sharing part of the state. Compact representation of T G , for example, describing a part of the state of the system in terms of a incidence matrix. Compact representation of continuous state for the quantities V , δ V , I, P and Q, describing, for example, a part of the state of the system in term of arrays, associating to each component of EI the corresponding values for V , δ V , I, P and Q (if any).
3) Solution power: To manage complexity at solution level (like explosion of the states of the model, stiffness and non exponential distributions), ability to perform simulations.
C. On the Construction of the Overall SG Model with Möbius
In this Section we address the problem of building the overall modeling framework based on the logical schemes proposed in Section II. To be more concrete, we describe it in terms of a few basic modeling formalisms and mechanisms supported by the tool Möbius, a powerful multiformalism/ multisolution tool [20] , which has features adequate to the needs of our modeling framework. In particular, the SAN and ADVISE formalisms, supported by Möbius, are suitable to model, respectively: i) the stochastic process representing the SG system, and ii) the attack steps an attacker would execute in order to gain new knowledge or access or to achieve new goals, and the adversary profile defining the qualities and interests of an attacker.
The process of constructing the model of a complex system like a SG, based on the manual definition of a lot of submodels, can be very expensive in terms of time and very error prone. The modeling process could be automatized, defining an automated procedure which receives in input the parameters describing the SG (including the topology, the components associated to each node and arc of EI, and the control system MCS), and generates the hierarchical composed model representing the SG. We use an alternative modular and compositional approach, inspired to that proposed in [21] for the electrical transmission networks. It aims to develop a generic and hierarchical composed model based on the composition and replication of template models linked together through sharing of state variables of each model. The overall model represents different smart grid configurations, being input parameters: both the electrical grid topology (represented by a graph) and the components (generators, loads, OLTC, LC, MVGC, LVGC, etc.) associated to each substation of the grid. With respect to the approach proposed in [21] , our approach:
• It copes with the greater complexity due to volatile microgrid generation, flexible generation and loads and newly appliances to control and manage the distribution of electricity, • It simplifies the representation of the dependencies between contiguous components (e.g., nodes and lines of the EI network), thus reducing the complexity of the model and improving the efficiency of the resulting model in terms of simulation time. In [21] the propagation of a fault (e.g., a lightning) through neighboring nodes and lines is explicitly represented by movement of tokens through places of different SAN, triggered by enabling conditions of activities based on the marking of the neighboring components. In our approach, this type of dependencies are represented, at higher level of abstraction, by single atomic C++-based reconfiguration actions implemented in the primitives of the SAN, that set a new configuration of the involved components, without triggering a sequence of SAN activities. Thus, the protection mechanism (that, when a fault occurs in an electrical component, triggers the trip of the neighboring components) is not explicitly modeled by the firing of a sequence of SAN activities, but as a result of a single reconfiguration action, that also accounts for the failures of the protection devices.
• It reduces the number of replicated components, by considering more complex logical component for each non anonymous replica. This aims to reduce the simulation time, that, in Möbius, is influenced by the number of replicas and by the complexity of the dependencies of a replica by the state of the other replicas. The proposed framework is based on templates, i.e., atomic or composed generic model identified as building block. A template represents a group of similar components having: i) the same logical structure, and ii) different parameter values for the activities and the events represented. A specific component of the group represented by a template is defined by non anonymous indexed replicas of the template [21] . Parameters and states of a generic component are defined, respectively, by C++ global arrays and array extended places, having one entry for each replica of the template. Each entry of these arrays represents the parameters and the state of a specific component. By applying an index to these arrays, each replica of a template can access to the parameters and the state of the other replicas of the same template, and, if needed, to the parameters and the state of the replicas of other templates. The overall model is obtained by the composition, using the join operator, of the three submodels shown in Fig. 5a : CMCS, MV MCS EI and LV MCS EI; they represent the 3 hierarchical levels of the logical architecture shown in Fig. 3 . The model MV MCS EI is obtained composing the submodels MV MCS and MV EI representing, respectively, MV-MCS and MV-EI, as shown in Fig. 5b .
The construction of the MV EI model, representing a topology like that shown in Fig. 1b , with n nodes and m arc, comprises the following steps: 1) To define the template models N 1, N 2 and A, representing the logical components, shown in Fig. 2 and 1c , associated to nodes and lines of the network. These models are obtained by composing the SAN atomic models representing each single component, as shown for N 1 in Fig. 6a (for the sake of simplicity, only a subset of the components is considered). A part of the state of each replica can be represented by the i-th entry of an array extended place of m entries (one entry for each replica). Each entry can be a C++ plain type (int, real, struct, etc.) or a more complex user defined type. For example, the voltage on the starting node (bus) of the arc (power line) l is represented by the double-type l-th entry V 1->Index(l)->M ark() of the array place V 1. The reactive power on the capacitor bank associated to the node N 1 of the arch l is modeled by the double-of-structtype l-th entry Q1->Index(l)->CB->M ark() of the array place Q1 (CB is a double type member of the struct type associated to each entry). These array places are shared between the replicas, thus a replica can access to the state of the other replicas. The parameters and the behavior (marking changes) of each replica can depend on the index of the replica, on the state of the other replicas and on the topology T G . The definition of T G , for the current configuration of SG, is represented by C++ data structures, statically defined at compilation time. The state of T G , representing for example a power line disconnected due to a fault, is represented by array places with m entries, one for each line, like openLines, faultyLines, f aultyN ode1, etc.
Which submodels are enabled for each replica, depends on the topology T G . For example, if a node of the network is the starting node of the arcs l 1 and l 2 , then only one of the two submodels N 1,l1 and N 1,l2 of the replicas NAN l1 and NAN l2 , respectively, is enabled. An atomic SAN composing a specific replica (i.e, an instance of the model MV EI) can be disabled by disabling for that replica all the activities included in the SAN. For example, the enabling condition of all activities in the atomic models representing a component associated to the node N 1 connected to the line l can be extended with the C++ logical condition "&& enabled [l] .n1". The parameter enabled [l] .n1 is set at compilation time, when the solver is generated for a specific configuration of the modeled SG.
Each SAN atomic model is a template that can represent the main characteristics described in Section II-D for the modeled component. For example, the volatility of a DER due to the weather conditions can be modeled in the SAN DG SAN like a stochastic process alternating different states of the DER: off (generator is not active), low (generated power is low), medium (generated power is medium) and high (generated power is high); the time spent in each state can be represented by random distributions. Same weather conditions can be modeled for a group of DER located on different nodes, by introducing dependencies between the involved SAN models; dependencies can be defined by synchronizing the activities of different SAN on a same shared state. Prediction of power production can be considered in terms of a random error state with respect to the actual production and time spent in each state: none, low, medium or high error. A cost (for example, a higher power loss) can be modeled for each prediction error, because the set points are no more optimal, being based on a weather condition different from the current one. Consequently, also the triggering of new reconfiguration actions for each new erroneous state can be modeled in the SAN model through state sharing between DG SAN and MV MCS model. Similar approaches can be considered to model random power demand flexibility in the atomic model FL SAN. In particular, random charging demand of arriving electrical vehicles and their assignment to the charging stations, based on the state of EI and the control policies, can be represented by a SAN model in term of stochastic process based on a client/server approach (where the loads are servers of random requests of charging).
Using the same approach adopted for the model MV EI, it is possible to construct the composed model MV MCS shown in Fig. 7 . The atomic SAN models LC SAN, MVGC SAN and WAN SAN are the templates representing, respectively, a generic logical controller LC, a generic MVGC and the associated WAN communication network connecting MVGC and LC. The atomic ADVISE models LC ADVISE and MVGC ADVISE are the templates representing the adversary profile and the steps to attack LC and MVGC, respectively. As shown in Fig. 7 , these models are composed with the operators join and rep, to obtain n MV GC replicas of the template MVGC WAN ATTACK, one replica for each MVGC, and n LC replicas of the template LC ATTACK, one replica for each LC.
In isolated mode, a replica of LC SAN models the local control actions performed by an LC to reconfigure the set points of the EI component associated to the LC, depending on the state of the LC. A C++ function controlledComponent(int LCIndex) is statically defined at compilation time to identify the component associated to the replica of LC SAN with index LCIndex. This function is used to identify the entry of the shared array places of the model MV EI representing the state (including the values for the set points) of the controlled component, that must be updated.
A replica of MVGC SAN models the control actions performed by an MVGC to reconfigure the set points of all the EI components controlled by the MVGC, depending on the state of the MVGC. In particular, MVGC SAN models the condition triggering a control action, the reaction delay (that also depends on the state of the associated WAN), and the evaluation of the reconfiguration strategy (that depends on the state of the controlled EI components, of the associated LC and of the involved communication networks), the effects of the attacks to the MVGC and to the WAN. In order to support voltage/var control algorithms, MVGC SAN model can implement different mixed nonlinear optimization problem with bounds and constraints.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has addressed the stochastic modeling and analysis of Smart Grid systems, to assess indicators useful to quantify the resilience degree of the system. Given the complexity and the size of the tackled problem, the work described here sets the basis towards fulfilling the final objective, that is building a generic, modular and composable modeling framework for SG evaluation. In particular, the steps accomplished so far include: i) definition of the logical structure of the SG, by identifying its main logical components both at grid and control level; ii) characterization of these components in terms of their state and relationships; iii) definition of a fault model appropriate for the targeted system and a set of relevant resilience-related indicators for the analysis; iv) discussion and identification of the approach to build the modeling framework, with preliminary exemplifications using the SAN formalism. The activities currently in progress as extension of the work presented in this paper go in the direction of: i) implementing the template models as outlined in the Section V, for both the grid components and the attack steps; ii) finding efficientenough solutions to model the voltage/var control algorithms implemented by the MCS subsystem; iii) select relevant scenarios (e.g., the use cases adopted by the SmartC2Net project) to exercise the modeling framework and practically demonstrate its usefulness and generality.
